Prisoners can defend against D.O.C. administrative shenanigans using the courts

Let's face it: anybody who has had any dealings with the Department of Corrections (DOC) for Washington State has never had anything nice to say about ANY of it. While there are good people within DOC, they're far outnumbered by the bureaucratic red-tape of confusion and compartmentalization rampant in our prison's administration. Fortunately for prisoners, the PRP can be used to ward off the misgivings of prison administration.

The threshold requirements for PRPs when challenging a criminal matter do not apply when no previous or alternative avenue for obtaining state judicial review exists. This includes ISRB hearings to set new minimum terms, PRP of Shepard, 127 Wn.2dn185, 191, 898 P.2d 828 (1995)@ PRP of Cashaw, 123 Wn.2d 138, 148-49, 866 P.2d 8 (1994)@ ISRB hearing regarding parole revocations, PRP of Mines, 146 Wn.2d 279, 287, 45 P.3d 535 (2002); and prison disciplinary hearings. PRP of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 205, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). The Washington Supreme Court followed this same approach when a trial court added a term of community custody to a prisoner's sentence after the time for appeal had expired. PRP of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 299-300, 88 P.3d 390 (2004). In these scenarios, the petitioner need not make a preliminary showing of ''actual prejudice'' or ''a complete miscarriage of justice.'' Rather, the petitioned ''need only show that he is restrained and that his restraint is unlawful.'' Id.

A restraint is unlawful in the prison setting if the ''conditions or the manner of the restraint of [the] petitioner are in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or the laws of the State of Washington.'' Kozol v. DOC, 185 Wn.2d 405, 409, 373 P.3d 244 (2016)(quoting RAP 16.4(c)(6). A prisoner under state custody is considered ''restrained'' under RAP 16.4(b). Kozol, 185 Wn.2d at 409.

General references to ''laws of this state'' or ''laws of the state of Washington'' not only include within their scope the statutes of Washington, but generally also include the Washington Administrative Code (WAC). See Inman v. Sandvig, 170 Wash. 112, 118, 15 P.2d 696 (1932)(general references to ''law'' in the state constitution apply not only to statutes, but also to administrative regulations); Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Rawson, 196 Wash. 548, 559-60, 83 P.2d 765 (1938)("Congress may authorize an administrative officer or body to make rules and regulations respecting the administration of law@ and such rules, when so made, have the force of law.''); see also State ex rel. Ralston, v. Dept. of Licenses, 60 Wn.2dn535, 542, 374 P.2d 571 (1962)(the general phrase includes law in its ''generic sense,'' which includes all sources of law, not just statutes). Because administrative rules and regulations are adopted through delegated legislative process took make law, they are given the force and effect of laws. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §§92-93, 126 (1962); PRP of Cashaw, 123 Wn.2d 138, 149, 866 P.2d8 (1994). As such, administrative rules (i.e. WAC) qualify as ''laws of the State of Washington'' under RAP 16.4(c)(2) and (6). Id. A showing that a governmental agency failed to comply with its own regulations is sufficient to establish that one is entitled to relief under RAP 16.4. PRP of Lopez, 126 Wn.App. 891, 894-95, 110 P.3d 764 (2005).

Sometimes prison personnel like to show prisoners who's in charge, and prisoners find themselves in front of disciplinary hearings for infractions which probably shouldn't even have been written. Despite that the infraction shouldn't have been written, the disciplinary hearing officer tends to biasly find prisoners guilty and take their good conduct time. In Washington, courts hold that due process requires prior notice of proscribed conduct be provided before punishment may be imposed for failing to comply. PRP of Kier, 108 Wn.App. 31, 39, 29 P.3d 720 (2001)(citing Schneck v. Edwards, 921 F.Supp. 679, 688 (E.D. Wash. 1996)); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.n104, 108 (1972); Bovoe v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 350-51 (1964). This principle applies within the prison disciplinary system. Kier, 108 Wn.App. at 39; see also Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986)(it is clearly established both by common sense and precedent that due process requires fair notice of what conduct is prohibited before a sanction can be imposed). This means that prison officials can't write up and punish prisoners for conduct that the prison never informed the prisoner was not allowed.

The sad part about prison discipline is that the factual determinations of prison officials must be based on ''some evidence'' in the record to support the prison disciplinary decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985); PRP of Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d 388, 397 n.7, 978 P.2d 1083 (1990)). This is the most-extreme, lowest standard of review in the justice system: it literally means that if there is an indication anywhere in the record that some misconduct occurred, then the disciplinary hearing officer can find the prisoner guilty and take away their good time credits. PRP of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 216, 277 P.3d 285 (2009). If a correctional officer's report says that your urinalysis result was positive for marijuana, but you show the hearing officer that the test cup doesn't even screen for marijuana, you'll still be found guilty because the officer's report said your result was positive and the officer's report is ''some evidence.'' Sickening.

Thus, review of prison disciplinary proceedings is properly limited to a determination of whether the action taken was so arbitrary and capricious as to deny the petitioner a fundamentally fair proceeding. Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 215 (citing PRP of Reismiller, 101 Wn.2d 291, 294, 678 P.2d 323 (1984)). The right to be free from arbitrary and capricious action is itself a fundamental right. Pierce County Sheriff v. Civil Service Comm'n., 98 Wn.2d 690, 693-94, 658 P.2d 648 (1983)(citing Williams v. Seattle School District 1, 97 Wn.2d 215, 221-22, 643 P.2d 426 (1982)). An agency's violation of the rules which govern its exercise of discretion is certainly contrary to law and, just as the right to be free from arbitrary and capricious action, the right to have an agency abide by the rules to which it is subject is also a fundamental right. Pierce County Sheriff, 98 Wn.2d at 694 (citing Leonard v. Civil Service Comm'n, 25 Wn.App. 699, 701-02, 611 P.2d 914 (1979)). In other words, if DOC isn't following the WAC rules for disciplinary hearings (WAC 137-28) and you're adversely affected, you can seek review of DOC's actions.

A court will reverse a prison discipline decision against a prisoner if the PRP shows that the proceeding was so arbitrary and capricious so as to deny the prisoner a fundamentally fair proceeding, resulting in the prisoner's prejudice. Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 215. Judging whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious requires an evaluation of the evidence produced at the hearing. Pierce County Sheriff, 98 Wn.2d at 690. "Arbitrary and capricious action has been defined as willful unreasoning action without consideration and in disregard of facts and circumstances.'' Id. (citing State v. Rowe, 93 Wn.2d 277, 284, 609 P.2d 1348 (1980)). A prison disciplinary proceeding is arbitrary and capricious if the prisoner was not afforded the minimum due process protections applicable in such cases. PRP of Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d 388, 396, 978 P.2d 1083 (1999)(citing PRP of Burton, 80 Wn.App. 573, 585, 910 P.2d 1295 (1996); and PRP of Anderson, 112 Wn.2d 546, 548-49, 772 P.2d 510 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004 (1989)). Minimum due prices in these cases means that the prisoner must (1) receive notice of the alleged violation, (2) be provided with the opportunity to present documentary evidence, (3) be provided with the opportunity to call witnesses when not unduly hazardous to the institutional safety and correctional goals, (4) receive a written statement of the evidence relied upon and (5) receive a written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary action. Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d at 396-97 (citing Dawson v. Hearing Comm'n, 92 Wn.2d 391, 397, 597 P.2d 1353 (1979)); but see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (minimum requirements of procedural due process in prison discipline cases are (1) written notice of the disciplinary violation, (2) the right to call witnesses at their hearing, (3) assistance in preparing for the hearing, (4) a written statement of the reasons for being found guilty, and (5) an fair and impartial decision-maker in the hearing).

If you challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at your disciplinary hearing, remember that the standard is so low that all they need is for there to literally be any mention of the underlying conduct to be on the record, so be sure to review this claim carefully. The more apt things to pay attention to seem to be the procedural due process requirements, because prison officials are usually callous to whether you're right or wrong and are so focused on looking for reasons to find guilt and impose punishment that they often miss a step in the process of running you through the hearing.